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CIA to fuse troops' opinions in war analysis
Friday - 10/14/2011, 4:34pm EDT
By KIMBERLY DOZIER
AP Intelligence Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The CIA is giving the military a greater say in the debate over how the war in Afghanistan is going by allowing battlefield commanders to weigh into the analysis at early stages.
The move prompted a flurry of criticism in the intelligence community's old guard, worried the change presages a campaign by newly arrived general-turned-CIA director David Petraeus to improve the poor marks the CIA gave the war effort in its own analysis earlier this year.
But the change was requested by the current Afghanistan commander, Marine Gen. John Allen, and agreed to by the CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, before Petraeus arrived at the agency.
"I saw it as strengthening the analysis, better informing the analytic process," Morell said in an interview with The Associated Press Friday.
Morell had been trying to find a way to narrow the gulf between the intelligence community's sometimes negative view of the war, versus the more hopeful one expressed by commanders in the fight, a senior intelligence official added, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters.
The change affects how CIA analysts conduct their semi-annual review of every Afghan district to determine several factors, including who is in control _ the Afghan government or the Taliban. The analysts used to brief their findings to the senior military commander in Kabul, who would then share them with his subordinates, to ask their opinion.
Now, the analysts will brief those battlefield commanders on their findings first. The commanders will have the option to point out something the CIA may have missed, in which case, the analyst can change the report _ or choose to hold firm, and simply note the commander's disagreement.
"The change will in no way undermine the objectivity of CIA analysis in the war in Afghanistan," Morell said. "We will still call it like we see it but now with even better ground truth."
The policy has been backed by National Intelligence Director James Clapper, another senior U.S. official said.
The change was originally reported to the AP as the brainchild of Petraeus, by senior intelligence officials who saw it as a way to improve the intelligence community's grading of the war. They spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive policy debates. Morell said Petraeus affirmed the move after he took the job as director.
The CIA's analysis makes up the bulk of national intelligence estimates, which help guide the White House and Congress in drafting future policy.
The last U.S. intelligence assessment offered a dim view of progress in Afghanistan despite the counterinsurgency campaign Petraeus oversaw there and painted a stark contrast to the generally upbeat predictions of progress from Petraeus and other military leaders. Petraeus has made no secret of his frustration with recent negative assessments coming primarily from the CIA, and said during his confirmation hearing that he planned to change the way the civilian analysts grade wars.
Petraeus took over as head of the CIA last month. He was directly in charge of the war in Afghanistan for more than a year _ his last job in uniform _ and oversaw the war as the head of Central Command before that. Like Iraq, Afghanistan has become a proving ground for the theories of counterinsurgency Petraeus is credited with making central to current U.S. military doctrine.
The previous U.S. intelligence assessment on Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year contradicted then-war-commander Petraeus' assessment. Where he saw "fragile but reversible progress," the analysts from across the intelligence community largely reported stalemate in several parts of the country. The disagreements were highlighted in the CIA's district by district assessments in which progress was graded geographically, with intelligence analysts seeing far less progress in key districts than did military commanders on the ground.
They emphasized a spate of assassinations by the Taliban and poor performance by the Afghan government in their report, two U.S. officials say.
Analysts also were negative about the performance of the Afghanistan security forces, whereas military commanders saw some units performing competently.
Petraeus insisted at his confirmation hearing in June that he could "grade my own work." But he vowed then to change the way the CIA grades wars, saying the analysts relied on battlefield data that was often six weeks to eight weeks old. He called that a snapshot that was outdated by the time it reached decision-makers.
Petraeus earlier told senators he'd disagreed with four such national intelligence estimates on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan __ two because he thought they were too pessimistic, and two he thought were too optimistic.