Afghan troops hold their ground at high cost

Sunday - 4/28/2013, 5:00am EDT

In this March 26, 2013, photo, an Afghan police commander explains to local tribal elders how the Afghan security forces intend to search the elders’ villages for insurgents, with an elder accompanying each police team, hours after a combined force of Afghans and Americans encircled the town in a pre-dawn raid. U.S. Brigade commander Col. Joseph "J.P." McGee, of the U.S. Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, listens at right, at the Afghan army base next to Forward Operating Base Connolly, in Khogyani district, Nangarhar province, east of Kabul, Afghanistan. U.S. commanders trying to hand off war-fighting responsibility by the end of 2014 are encouraged by the uneven yet steady progress of fledgling Afghan security forces. (AP Photo/Kim Dozier)

KIMBERLY DOZIER
AP Intelligence Writer

FORWARD OPERATING BASE CONNOLLY, Afghanistan (AP) -- The Americans could be spotted waiting for the Chinooks in the 2 a.m. darkness only by the shape of their night-vision goggles, as they shared a cigarette with glowing embers in quick drags among the kneeling assaulters in the chilled dark.

They would be on the first two helicopters to drop into the villages of the Khogyani district in the shadows of the Tora Bora mountains, kicking off a four-day operation against the Taliban by roughly 175 Americans and 1,250 Afghan troops, in a teeth-clenching test of U.S. mentoring and training.

The Afghans were lined up behind the Americans, leaning back on their 130-pound backpacks, saving their strength to carry the loads onto the Chinooks for their first air assault, and without the Americans' high-tech goggles, letting their eyes adjust to the dark for the assault to come.

They didn't talk much.

A Predator drone feed showed the groups landing in the darkened district -- dark spots trudging slowly up hills and sometimes falling into ditches -- U.S. and Afghan alike. They set up a post to oversee the insurgent-ridden villages they would be guarding for the next four days as Afghan police cleared them out house by house.

Intelligence intercepts showed most of the insurgents already had fled to the farthest village just beneath Tora Bora, where Osama bin Laden escaped his American pursuers, after watching the Afghan troops and police mass the day before.

The Afghans and their American security advisers from the U.S. Army's 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, were less interested in pursuing them than in making sure they could not return, making way for the Afghan local police who would take their place.

In the daylight, village elders were invited to meet with the Afghan general who led the attack, and they said they welcomed the troops because they were Afghans, not foreigners.

The U.S. brigade's commander, Col. Joseph "J.P." McGee, sat quietly in a corner, making the briefest of comments. This was an Afghan-to-Afghan conversation.

Overall in the operation, there were tactical missteps that Americans pointed out privately to the Afghan commanders, tactfully out of earshot of their subordinates. There were shortfalls in supplies, and requests were sometimes denied for U.S. air support for nighttime bombing runs or medical assistance.

But in The Associated Press' visits to Khogyani district and some of the country's most contested southern and eastern provinces -- Helmand, Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar -- multiple operations were led or carried out mostly by Afghans. Their officers were doing the bulk of the planning and execution, responding without U.S. aid to large-scale Taliban attacks or choosing targets the Americans sometimes disagreed with, if the U.S. advisers were consulted at all.

The uneven but steady progress is encouraging for the U.S. commanders trying to hand off responsibility ahead of the December 2014 drawdown of most U.S. forces, from roughly 66,000 Americans at the start of this year, to an as-yet-undetermined residual force of NATO troops that have been estimated will be around 8,000 to 10,000.

The Afghans are paying heavily for that lead role, with casualty figures rising steadily, more than doubling from 550 Afghan soldiers and police killed in 2011 to more than 1,200 last year, according to data compiled by the Washington-based Brookings Institution.

This year is bloodier still, with 300 security personnel, mostly police, killed in March alone, according to a top Afghan security official. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was unauthorized to discuss the unpublished figure. That monthly average is roughly equivalent to the total number of U.S. forces lost in 2012, according to AP's own count of 297 U.S. troops killed, out of a total of 394 coalition forces.

About 660 militants were reported to have been killed by coalition and Afghan forces so far this year, compared with close to 3,000 militants last year. The NATO command does not issue reports on the number of insurgents its troops have killed, and Afghan military figures, from which the AP compiles its data, cannot be independently verified.

Still, there is little public outcry over the Afghan losses.

While the Afghan army's attrition rate spiked to 4.1 percent in January, it has dropped back closer to the annual average of 2.6 percent. The combined Afghan army and police roster remains in excess of 332,753, according to figures provided by NATO's training mission, and the combined forces are clawing back some new ground from the Taliban, U.S. and Afghan officials say.

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